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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTRACT FOR FEEs BETWEEN AN ATTORNEY FOR
A BANKRUPT AND ATTORNEYS

FOR THE TRus=-n--Plaintiff

was an attorney

who represented the majority of the creditors of A. A also consulted the
plaintiff for legal advice, and the plaintiff engaged in some litigation for his
benefit. The plaintiff later engaged the defendants, a firm of attorneys, to
continue in the service of A, the defendants agreeing that such services would
be rendered under the direction of the plaintiff, and that their compensation
should be determined by the plaintiff. A was adjudicated bankrupt, and the
defendants were retained as counsel by the trustee in bankruptcy, with the
consent of the court and with knowledge of the fact that the defendants were
subject to the supervision of the plaintiff. The plaintiff materially aided the
defendants in realizing on the assets of the estate, and the defendants were
allowed a liberal fee by the court. Under the provisions of the contract, the
plaintiff demanded forty per cent of the sum received by the defendants, which
was refused on the ground that the agreement was void as against public
policy. The plaintiff then instituted this action. Held, that the plaintiff can
recover.

Weil v. Neary, 22 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).

It is a well-recognized rule that if an attorney represents adverse interests
in legal proceedings, even though his services are beneficial, he is not entitled
to any compensation because his contract is void as against public policy It
is equally well settled that, if the attorney's interests are not actually adverse,
so that he is not required to assume a dual capacity, he will be allowed to
recover compensation from both clients.2 Therefore in the present case, as a
contract for the division of fees between attorneys acting for the same interests
is valid,' the sole question to be determined is whether the plaintiff and the
defendant, acting in co-ordination, were representing the same interests, or
whether their interests were adverse. As the duty of the trustee in bankruptcy
is to realize all possible assets for distribution to the creditors, unless the
claims of the creditors are contested' he is properly regarded as a holder of
the legal estate for the benefit of creditors, the latter being the cestuis que
r=stents.6 Consequently a trustee in bankruptcy can hire counsel who also
represents the creditors, without violating the rule against adverse interests,
because both the creditors and the trustee are interested in liquidating the assets
Strong v. International Building Union, 183 Ill. 97, 55 N. E. 675 (1899);
Eisemann v. Hazard, 16I App. Div. 703, 146 N. Y. Supp. 685 (1914).
2Pecksham
v. Ramsey, 208 Mass. 112, 94 N. E. 290 (191i); Keyes v.
McKerrow, i8o Mass. 261, 62 N. E. 259 (192) ; also see In re Habegger, 139

Fed. 623 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o5).
I Owen v. Dudley, 217 U. S. 488 (igio) ; it re McGee, 205 Pa. 590, 55
Atl. 776 (19o3) ; Parker v. Gartside, 178 Ill. App. 634 (1913).
"In re Wooten, 118 Fed. 67o (E. D. N. C. 19o2).
'In re Kreuger, 196 Fed. 705 (E. D. Ky. 1911); Throckmorton v. Hickman, 279 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922) ; It re Kessler, 186 Fed. 127 (C. C. A.
2d, 1911) ; BLACK, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1926) § 717.
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of the estate. Viewed in this light, the above case would seem to be correctly
decided. But a further question arises, namely, the effect of the retention of
the bankrupt's attorney by the trustee. The courts have adopted the rule that
a retention of the bankrupt's attorney by the trustee is inadvisable, but it is
permissible at the discretion of the trustee with the consent of the court.
This rule seems to totally disregard the fact that the duty of the attorney in
representing the bankrupt is to preserve the assets of the estate, and his duty
as representative of the trustee and creditors is to realize all that is possible on
the assets of the estate, with the result that his interests are directly adverse.
But the court in the instant case, even without disturbing this established rule,
might have denied the plaintiff a recovery on another theory. They could
have reasoned that, if the interests of the trustee and the creditors are actually
identical, the plaintiff should not be entitled to receive a fee from the creditors
and receive an additional fee from the trustee, through the medium of the
defendants, because in that event the plaintiff would be receiving double compensation for the same enterprise

BANxRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS

OF BANKRUPT'SHAREHOLDER

FOR

THE BENEFIT OF A CORPORATION AS A BAR TO DiscHrARE-The president and

owner of the controlling interest of a corporation made a false statement in
writing, overvaluing the corporate assets, and the property falsely obtained
thereby went to the corporation. Subsequently he became bankrupt, and the
defrauded creditor resisted his discharge under § 14b (3) of the Bankruptcy
AcW. Held, that a discharge will be refused though the bankrupt did not,
himself, receive the property. Levy, Bankrupt v. Industrial Finance Corp.,
U. S. Sup. Ct., decided March 5, 1928.
In the case of In re Applebaum' it was held that the bankrupt and not his
corporation must obtain the property, else his discharge will not be barred.
But most of the few cases that have arisen upon the point are contra.' A false
statement, even as to the property of another, should be material if the bankrupt, however indirectly, receives the benefit. The right of discharge is stat'I
re Champion Wagon Co., 193 Fed. IOO4 (N. D. N. Y. 1912); In re
Smith, 203 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); In re Baber, Iig Fed. 520, 528
(E. D. Tenn. 19o2).

In re Dunn & Co., I46 Fed. 402 (D. C. D. Pa. 19o6) ; In re Smith, supra
note 6; BLAcK, op. cit. supra, § 732.
'In re Carolina Cooperage Co., 96 Fed. 95o (E. D. N. C. 1899).
1 36 STAT. 839 (I910), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XI, § 32b (3), which provides,
"the judge shall . . . discharge the applicant unless he has . . . ob-

tained money or property on credit upon a materially false statement in writing,
made by him to any person

.

.

.

for the purpose of obtaining credit from

such person."
' 1 F. (2d) 685, 7 Am. B. R (N. s.) 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
'In re Dresser, 145 Fed. 1021, 13 Am. B. R. 616 (S. D. N. Y. I9O5);
In re Bleyer, 215 Fed. 896, 33 Am. B. R. 76 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; In re Stafford,
226 Fed. 127, 35 Am. B. R. 747 (D. C. Conn. 1915).
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utory and is determined by the bankrupt's good faith. So, if he adopts a false
statement that another innocently made, and obtains credit thereby, he comes
5
within Section i4b of the Act. It has been held that a partner may be barred
from his individual discharge because of false statements relative to partnership
affairs.' Here, the situation is equally within the mischief at which the statute
aims. Even recognizing the separate entity of corporations, the interposition
of an artificial person ought not to make a difference, as the bankrupt indirectly
obtained the benefit. How far the courts will go where the bankrupt has no
pecuniary interest in the borrower's obtaining a loan is not decided. But the
principal case, going thus far, seems a fair and logical interpretation of the
legislative intent.

BANKS

AND

BANKING-CoNsTRucTIvE

TRUST WHERE BANK

RECEIVES A

WRONGFUL DEPOST-A city treasurer deposited a check in the bank on which

it was drawn and received credit therefor by a transfer on the books. The
bank received the deposit knowing that it was wrongful because of their failure
to comply with the statutory requirements of a public depository. The bank
was later declared insolvent. Held (one judge dissenting), that the city was
entitled to a preference, as the assets of the bank were impressed with a trust
to the amount of the check. Leach v. Farmers Savings Bank of Hamburg,
216 N. W. 748 (Iowa 1927).
Where funds are wrongfully deposited and such fact is known to the
banker, practically all authorities agree that the funds are impressed with a
trust' To recover them however some difficulty arises in tracing.' At early
common law the specific funds had to be traced, so that if once mingled, the
This doctrine was later changed on the theory
funds could not be recovered
4
that you need not trace the specific pieces but can recover in kind. So too

'7 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1925) § 3325. As to the right to bar
a discharge of the bankrupt's entire indebtedness and not merely that portion
fraudulently obtained, see 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 8o (1926).
"In re Aldridge, 168 Fed. 93 (N. D. N. Y. 19o9).
'lIn re Perlmutter, 256 Fed. 862, 43 Am. B. R. 362 (D. C. N. J. 1919).
City of New Hampton v. Leach, 201 Iowa 316, 207 N. W. 348 (1926).
See Note (19o6) 5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 886; (1916) 8 AN. CAS. ix6.
2 See WIISTON, Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused With
Other Property, (1889) 2 HARv. L. REV. 28; AmEs, Following Misappropriated Property Into Its Product, (19o6) 19 HA.v. L. REv. 511; ScOTT, Right to
Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled With Other Property, (1914) 27 H~Av.
L. REv. 125.
See WILLISTON, op. cit. supra 34; Ex parte Dale, ii Ch. Div. 772 (1879).
'Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De G., M. & J. 372 (1853); Knatchbull v. Hallett,
13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879); Massey v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958 (1894). See ScoTr,
op. cit. supra 131, "The rule of the Hallett case met with unanimous approval
in this country." See, however, a subsequent case contra: Commonwealth v.
Trademen's Trust Co. No. 2, 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1915). If, however,
the fund is dissipated, the claimant has only a personal claim against the
wrongdoer. Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707 (1914).
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recovery was allowed even though the subject matter had been changed.' In
all of those cases there was, however, a definite trust res in the beginning. The
principal case is important in that no particular pieces of money were ever
handed to the bank. Nothing in fact occurred except a transfer of credits.
The majority of the court reasoned that it was the same as if money had been
taken out and replaced, and since this was a wrongful deposit, a trust attached
to the cash on hand to the extent of the face of the check. The decision
might be supported by saying that the debt of the bank was the trust res and
that this had been transformed to cash. The difficulty in this, however, would
be the requirement of augmenting the assets,' the fact that it was a mere change
of debts, and also the difficulty of finding a trust of a man's own debt.! Many
of the cases relied on by the court do not, it is submitted, sustain its position
in finding a trust res. The mere fact that a check is considered as money
where the question involved is a violation of a criminal statute against receiving
money after insolvency is not exactly similar;' nor are cases where the question
is what amounts to payment of a check 1' As to the nature of the proceeds of
a note or check sent for collection, the majority of courts disfavor any idea of
trust, whether a check on the bank or some other medium., It may be that
the court was influenced by the idea of the check being an equitable assignment,
but on the facts this would be doubtful, and in all events this doctrine has been
negatived by the Negotiable Instruments Law.' The federal rule in the Iowa
'See AmEs op. cit. supra and cases cited; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670
(1889).
"Leach v. State Savings Bank, 215 N. W. 728 (1927). But see Davenport
Plow Co. v. Lamp, 8o Iowa 722, 45 N. W. 1O49 (189o); Slater v. Oriental
Mills, 18 R. 1. 352, 27 Atl. 443 (1893).
Slater v. Oriental Mills, supra note 6 and cases cited.
"This because of the difficulty of finding any appropriation, i. e., of finding
the res of the trust. Many instances of allowing recovery in such cases have
been so decided because of the law denying recovery to a third party beneficiary. See ScoTT, CASES oN TRusrs (1919) 54 and 8o.
'See Ellis v. State, 138 Wis. 513, 119 N. W. iiio (igog) ; State v. Ostby,
21o N. W. 934, 936 (Iowa 1926) (where the Iowa court speaking of whether
or not a check was money and in answering the requirement of augmentation
of assets said, "The amount of money in the bank would not be increased, augmented or changed; the transaction could in a way be said to be a 'mere matter
of bookkeeping"').
103 R. C. L. 641. See (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 437.
'Bank v. Armstrong, 148 Ui. S. 50 (1892) ; Milling Co. v. Trust Co., 242
Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922) ; Citizens Bank v. Bradley, 136 S. C. 511, 134
S. E. 510 (1926). Contra: Nurse v. Satterlee, 81 Iowa 491 (189o) and cases
cited 31 YALE L. J. supra note IO. The dissenting judge in the principal case
distinguishes between cases where both parties are customers of the bank and
where one of them is a stranger. No help can be had from the cases as to
cashier's checks, certified checks, or certificates of deposit, since in the absence of
other facts nb preference can be required. See Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 68o.
"See NoTE (1928) 37 YAix L. J. 626, discussing Leach v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211 N. W. 5o6 (1926).
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circuit in flatly contra to the principal case." The decision of the state court
rests upon a fiction. The effect of it is not only to charge the bank with fraud,
but also to permit the city to share pro rata with other preferred claimants
whose money did in fact increase the supply of cash on hand. This is certainly
a far step from the classic idea of a trust res. In view of the conflict of
authority, and because of the result bringing obvious injustice in distribution
involving the rights of other preferred depositors, and the lack of support to
be obtained from the cases relied on, it is submitted that the principal case
should not be followed without a more satisfactory explanation, if there be
such, of finding the trust res.
BILLS AND NOTEs--NEGoTIABILITY-OPTION IN HOLDER TO TAKE MAKER'S
DEPosIT IN PAYEE BANK-The plaintiff, as indorsee, sued the maker of an
instrument in the form of a time note. The instrument provided: "If at any
time the holders of this note feel insecure regarding payment of this note, said
holder is authorized to take any or all funds I may have on deposit at the First
National Bank, Cheyenne, Old., to my credit, and place as a credit to this note."
Held, that the instrument is not negotiable. First State Bank of Cheyenne v.
Barton, 263 Pac. 142 (Okla. 1928).
The principal case illustrates one aspect of the problem of so-called "acceleration clauses,"' a problem which is only partially settled by the Negotiable
Instruments Law. When the maker promises to pay at a fixed date or sooner,
at his option, the time of payment is sufficiently certain under the N. I. L? and
the instrument is therefore negotiable.' A similar situation is presented when
the maker promises that, if there is a default in interest payments, the whole
principal shall become due.4 This is really a "maker's option" case, because
the maker has control of the payments. But when there is an unlimited option
in the holder to collect the principal sum at any time, the N. I. L. is of no
assistance. The principal case follows the accepted view that the time of payment is uncertain and that the instrument is therefore not negotiable.5 A very
"Beard v. Independent District of Pella County, 88 Fed. 375 (C. C. A. 8th,
18g8). This case has been cited with approval in several courts in as many
different circuits. See Larabee Flour Mills v. First National Bank, 13 F. (2d)
330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) and cases cited.
'On the subject in general, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Acceleration Pro-

visions inTime Paper, (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 747.

' N. I. L. § 4: "An instrument is payable at a determinable future time,
within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be payable: 2. On or
before a fixed or determinable future time specified therein."
'Smith v. Nelson Land & Cattle Co., 212 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914):
National Salt Co. v. Ingraham, 143 Fed. 8o5 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o6). But cf.
Pierce v. Talbot, 213 Mass. 330, oo N. E. 553 (I913).
'Commercial Savings Bank v. Schaffer, 19o Iowa io88, 181 N. W. 492
(12i). The same rule is applied to a failure to pay an instalment of principal.
Star Brewing Co. v. Higgins, 248 Mass. 480, 143 N. E. 332 (1924).
'Oklahoma State Bank v. First National Bank, io8 Okla. 272, 236 Pac. 581
(1925); Moyer v. Hyde, 35 Idaho 16I, 204 Pac. io68 (1922); Puget Sound
State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917).
But cf. Empire National Bank v. High Grade Oil Refining Co., 26o Pa. 255,

RECENT CASES
common application of this rule deals with the case where authority is given
to the holder to have judgment entered against the maker before maturity.! It
is difficult to assign any good reason why the time of payment is any more
uncertain in one class of cases than in the other. In both there is a fixed time
at which the instrument is to mature at all events. In neither can one tell from
the face of the instrument how soon it will mature. The distinction, although
well established, seems unfortunate because it leads to a great deal of confusion
in situations where the instrument gives an option both to the holder and to
the makefi. The court in the principal case fears that the payee might take the
funds which the maker has on deposit and then transfer the note to a holder in
due course. The wording of the clause should be sufficient to put a subsequent
holder on notice that a total or partial payment might have been made by
appropriating the maker's bank deposit. While this feature would detract from
the desirability of the instrument, as a purchase, it should not of itself destroy
its negotiability.
BILLs AND

NoTEs-NEGoTmnnJTY-REFERENCES

TO

COLLATERAL

AGREE-

MENTs-The defendant gave the note in question to the company as collateral
to a stock subscription. The company did not accept the subscription. The
note was indorsed by the company to the plaintiff, a holder in due course. On
the face of the note, following the promise and above the defendant's signature,
was the statement, "This note is collateral to stock subscription No. - , of
even date herewith." Held (two judges dissenting), that the note is not negotiable, because dependent on the acceptance of the subscription contract. Ivory
v. Lamoreaux, 217 N. W. 54 (Mich. 1928).
Whether or not a note is negotiable is to be determined from the face of
the note alone.Y For it to be negotiable, the promise to pay must be unconditional? When a note states on its face that it is given as collateral security
for another obligation, it is conditional, because any liability on it is contingent
upon a failure to meet the obligation the performance of which it is given to
secure? Further, if by its terms, the note is "subject" to the terms of another
contract, it is conditional because its payment is dependent upon the performance
of the collateral contract.4 But where the credit of the maker is pledged to
the payment of the note, it is not deprived of its negotiability because it recites
io3 At. 602 (1918) (Holder could demand more collateral at any time, at his
own discretion. If the maker did not furnish it, the instrument became due.
Court held that negotiability was not impaired).
'Muender

v. Muender, 182 Wis. 417, 196 N. W. 773 (1924); Johnson v.
122 Adt. 7 (1923); see Note (911)
59 U. oF PA. L.

Phillips, I43 Md. i6,
REV. 573.
1

N. I. L.

§i

(i);

New London Credit Syndicate v. Neale, [1898] 2

-Q. B. 487.

2
N. I. L. § 1 (2); Berenson v. Fire Ins. Co., 201 Mass. 172, 87 N. E.
687 (199).
' Costello v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293 (1879); Bank v. Sprague, 14 R. I.

410 (1884).

'Klots Throwing Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 179 Fed. 813 (C. C. A. 2d,

19io) ; Bank v. Blazek, 115 Kan. 178, 222 Pac. 748

(1924).
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that there is a collateral agreement out of which it arose or which furnished
the basis of its consideration.' Nor will such a recital serve to notify an indorsee of a failure of consideration, for mere notification that there is a collateral agreement does not notify him of its breach.' While the note in question is susceptible of any one of the three constructions mentioned, it would
seem that, having reference to the normal commercial meaning of the word
collateral, from the face of the note it appears to have been given as collateral
security for the performance of a stock subscription contract, and so is conditional and non-negotiable. And even were this construction not adopted, the
language used seems sufficiently strong to indicate an intention to subject the
note to the terms of the subscription contract, rather than merely mention the
transaction out of which the note arose. Thus, under either construction, the
note would be conditional and hence non-negotiable.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--CusTOis DUTIES-VALIDITY OF FLEXIBLE TAIFF-

Under the Tariff Act of September 2i, 1922,' the President was authorized to
make investigation into the difference between cost of production here and
abroad of articles dutiable by the Act, with the assistance of the Tariff Commission, and to make such changes in any rate of duty necessary to equalize
the same.2 Pursuant to this power, the President ordered the duty on barium
dioxide increased from four to six cents per pound. The Act was attacked on
the ground that it was an invalid delegation of the power to tax.3 Held, that the
Act is constitutional.' J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, U. S. Sup.
Ct, decided April 9, 1928.'
This is the first time that the "flexible provisions" of the FordneyMcCumber bill have been presented for judicial construction. It raises again
the question of the proper extent of administrative action. The classic distinction, as adopted by the Court, lies between the delegation of power to make a
law, and the making of a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
'N. I. L. § 3 (2) ; Bank v. Wentworth, 218 Mass. 30, io5 N. E. 626 (914)
("For value received as per terms of contract") ; Bank v. Sullivan, 66 Wash.
375, 119 Pac. 82o (ig1i).
'Critcher v. Ballard, i8o N. C. 111, 104 S. E. 134 (i92o) ; Bank v. Sugar
Co., 162 App. Div. 248, I47 N. Y. Supp. 498 (1914).
STAT. 941

(1922), U. S. C. (1925)
TIT. XIX, §§ 154-156.
the Act the President may consider (a) differences in production,
including wages and material costs; (b) differences in wholesale selling prices;
(c) privileges accorded the foreign producer; (d) "any other advantages or
disadvantages in competition."
142

2 Under

'U.

S. CONSTITUTrION, ART. I, Sect. 8: "The Congress shall have power to

lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises
'The second contention of the appellant, that this was not a true revenue
bill, was dismissed on the ground that a tax does not lose its character as such
because of the incidental motive of protection. Cf. Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.

S. 20 (1922).

' See also

(1926)

75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 176 (lower court).

RECENT .CASES
state of things upon which the law makes its own action depend. Here the
Chief Justice found no difficulty in putting the equalization feature on the constitutional side of the line, as the Act set an "intelligible principle" (i. e.
equality) to which the President was to conform. Hence the Executive was
not himself writing the tariff, but was merely filling in the blanks of an expressed policy too inconvenient for Congress to superintend in detail.' The
appellant's argument in a sense began at this point. While conceding an apparent standard, it contended that the production factors are so varied and indefinite that the fact can never be found; thus, as the standard is, incapable of
definite ascertainment, the President, in making his decision, in effect is setting
the standard himself. This was not directly answered by the Court. It cannot,
however, be said that the President and his assistant body are without any working basis whatever. Furthermore, the Act provides for a hearing in all cases.
Therefore, admitting the many practical difficulties, one is forced to the conclusion that the difference between this and other fact-finding bodies is only one
of degree. The rate-making powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission
furnish a close analogy.' Whether actual equality will be reached, or whether
an uncertain tariff makes for good business,' is a question of judgment which
the Court cannot decide. So far duties have been changed in comparatively
few cases.
CONSTITuT OAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-SERvICE OF PROCESS ON NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS-A New Jersey statute' provided that a non-resident who

operates a motor vehicle in the state shall be deemed thereby to have appointed
the Secretary of State his attorney upon whom service may be made in
all actions against such non-resident growing out of the negligent operation
of the motor vehicle. The defendant, a non-resident, negligently drove
his automobile into the plaintiff's wagon. The plaintiff thereupon instituted suit
against the defendant in the New Jersey courts by leaving process with the
Secretary of State, who gave actual notice of the suit to the defendant, although
he was not required to do so by the statute. Held, that the statute is unconstitutional. Wachter v. Pismitti,U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Feb. 20, 1928.
The power of a state to regulate the use of its highways extends to nonresidents as well as residents, and therefore a requirement that a non-resident
procure an automobile operator's license is valid? It has also been held that
'.United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6 (19i1) ; Oceanic Navigation Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (igog) ; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 2o4
U. S. 364 (1907).
'A somewhat similar clause in the McKinley Tariff Act of i89o, which
allowed the President to put retaliatory duties on otherwise free articles where
he found the duties imposed by the foreign exporting country to be reciprocally
unreasonable, was sustained in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (892).
'I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912).
'For adverse criticism see PAGE, MAKING THE TARIFF IN THE UNITED
STATES 83-99.
(P. L. 1924, p. 517) c. 232.
'Hendricks v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o (1915).
ILAws OF 1924
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a non-resident may be forbidden to operate an automobile unless he has authorized a state official to receive service of process in actions brought against him
arising out of the vehicle's operation.' The privilege of doing what may be
constitutionally prohibited confers jurisdiction on the state
Therefore, such
statutes do not conflict with the principle of Pennoyer v. Neff,5 that due process
of law requires that a court rendering a personal judgment.must have jurisdiction over the defendant. The requirement of due process is satisfied by notice,'
hearing and a proceeding adapted to the issue. In construing a statute" similar
to that involved in the principal case, the Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski"
concluded that it was constitutional because it provided for a reasonable method
of notification and afforded ample opportunity for a hearing. But in the
instant case, the statute contained no provision making it reasonably probable
that notice of the service would be communicated. It is not enough that there
may be notice, the statute to be valid must require it? The majority"3 of the
court, therefore, felt bound to hold the statute unconstitutional. The dissenting
opinion ' proceeded on the theory that it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court
to construe the statute at all because of two reasons: first, the defendant did
not raise the point as to the statute not making it obligatory on the Secretary
of State to give notice in the state courts and therefore the state courts had
had no opportunity to construe the statute in that light; and secondly, the
defendant was not prejudiced in that he actually received notice. Inasmuch as
it has been, with but few exceptions, the settled practice of the Supreme Court.
to avoid passing on the constitutionality of a statute when it is unnecessary to
the disposition of the case, the majority opinion appears to be a departure.

CONTEMPT-EVIDENCE NEcESSARY TO CommrT A BANKRUPT FOR FAILURE
TURN OVER AcCOUNT BooKs-An order directing the bankrupt to turn over
certain account books to their receivers was obtained and served. The bankrupt failed to comply. To compel performance, the receivers then instituted
contempt proceedings which resulted in a decree of commitment. The bankrupt appealed against this order, claiming the receivers had not shown his
ability to comply beyond a reasonable doubt. Held (one judge dissenting), that
the commitment was proper and required only a preponderance of evidence to
sustain it. In re Oriel, 23 F.(2d) 409 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
The court based its decision upon two grounds: first, that the validity of
TO

'Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o (1916).
"Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists (1926), 39 HARV. L.
REV. 5563.
95 U. S. 714 (1877).
6
Roller v. Holby, 176 U. S. 398 (900).
1
MASS. GEN. LAWS, C. 9o, as amended by 1923 MASS. STAT. c. 431 § 2.
s274 U. S. 352 (1927).
For comment on the state court decision from a
conflict of laws viewpoint see (1926) 73 U. OF PA. L. Rr;v. 171.
'Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413 (915).
"°Opinion by Taft, C. I.
UBrandeis,
Holmes and Stone, J1.
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the turnover order was not open to attack in this proceeding; and secondly, that
the violation was a civil contempt requiring only that amount of proof necessary
in an ordinary civil action. Since the only question at issue in a contempt proceeding is the present ability of the alleged contemnor to obey,' the first premise
seems supported by logic as well as authority.' However, regarding the second
contention, the decisions are not at all harmonious. A few cases have held
such a proceeding criminal in nature, and have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in strict adherence to the general rule of evidence there applicable.'
On the other hand, some authorities have advanced the view adopted by the
principal case.4 But the rule most frequently followed is the one contended for
by the dissent, namely, that the character of the proceeding is civil; but, because
of the severity of the punishment, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is demanded
in order to justify indefinite imprisonment for failure to comply. The majority
opinion denies the reason behind this compromise view, on the ground that the
bankrupt has at his command the best evidence of his inability to obey, and upon
production of such evidence his contempt will at once be purged.! By application of the usual test relied on to differentiate civil from criminal contempts,
the more accurate view seems to be that a violation of a turnover order constitutes a civil contempt, because the purpose of the confinement is remedial
'Frederick

v. Silverman, 250 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 3d, I918); i Cou=,
254; BLAcic, BANKRUPTCY (1922) §231. Violation of a
turnover order raises only a prima facie case of contempt. It is not conclusive
that the bankrupt still is able to make payment or surrender the property, and
the bankrupt is entitled to a hearing at which to present his defense of inability.
In re Myersdn, 253 Fed. 510 (D. C. E. D. Pa. i918) ; In re Davison, 143 Fed.
673 (D. C. R. 1. 19o6); In re Hausman, 121 Fed. 984 (C. C. A. 2d, *I9o3).
Inability to comply affords a complete defense. It re Holden, 2o3 Fed. 229
BANKRUPTCY

(92)

(C. C. A. 6th, 1913); In re Dickens, 175 Fed. 8o8 (D. C. S. D. Ala. i9o9);

In re McNaught, 225 Fed. 511 (D. C. Mass. i9o3).
'In re Frankel, 184 Fed. 539 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. ig1) ; In re Richards,
183 Fed. 501 (D. C. W. D. Ark. i9io) ; In re Marks, 176 Fed. ioi8 (D. C.
E. D. Pa. 91o). See also BLACK, BANKRUPTCY (1922) § 231.
'Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 8th, igio) ; Moody v. Cole, 148
Fed. 295 (D. C. Me. i9o6); Boyd v. Glucklich, ii6 Fed. 131 (C. C. A. 8th,
1902).

' Reardon v. Pensoneau, i8 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 8th,

1927)

; it re Cramer,

175 Fed. 879 (D. C. Mass. i9o9) ; I; re Cole, 144 Fed. 392 (C. C. A. ist,
19o6) ; 163 Fed. i8o (C. C. A. ist, 19o8).

'Freed v. Central Trust Co., 215 Fed. 873 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914) ; Stuart v.
Reynolds, 204 Fed. 709 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913) ; Kirsner v. Taliaferro, 2o2 Fed.
SI (C. C. A. 4th, 1912). See BLAcx, BANKRUPTCY (1922) § 229. See also
In re Adler, I7O Fed. 634 (D. C. E. D. Okla. 19o) ; In re Switzer, 14o Fed.
976 (D. C. S. Car. 1905) (holding strong suspicion not sufficient) ; In re Goldfarb Bros., 131 Fed. 643 (D. C. N. D. Ga. 19o4) (strong probability not
enough).
'The contemnors "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets." In
re Nevitt, *17 Fed. 448, 461 (C. C. A. 8th, I9o2). But the bankrupt should be
discharged after a reasonable time when it clearly appears he is unable to
comply with the order. In re Karp, 196 Fed. 998 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1912) ;
It re Cummings, i88 Fed. 767 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1911) ; it re Taylor, 114 Fed.
607 (D. C. Colo. 1901).
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and coercive, not punitive nor in vindication of the court's authority.' Furthermore, despite the weight of precedent, it would appear that the requirement in
this instance of an added burden of proof upon the receiver or creditor would
facilitate concealment of assets, and so simultaneously contravene public policy,
and defeat one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.8

CORPORATIONS-EFFECT OF THE CONSENT OF ALL STOCKHOLDERS TO AN AcT

ULTRA Vnms-Plaintiff brings this action to cancel a corporate mortgage. The

mortgage was given to defendant, who was about to retire as president of the
corporation, in exchange for a release of certain claims he held against it. The
mortgage was given with the knowledge and consent of A from whom plaintiff
purchased his stock. All the remaining stockholders consented to the mortgage.
Plaintiff purchased his stock with full knowledge of the mortgage given defendant. The plaintiff contends that the mortgage is ultra vires and therefore
void. Held, that the mortgage would not be cancelled. Behrinan v. Zelman,
130 Misc. 846 (N. Y. 1927).

The cotirt here decided that it was not necessary to determine whether the
defendant's act was ultra vires. It is well settled that a general application
of the doctrine of ultra vires renders all such acts void,1 because: (i) of the
injury to the public, (2) to the stockholders, (3) and to the creditors.? The
court pointed out that the second and third objections could not be made in the
principal case because the stockholders had consented and there were no creditors. The question therefore resolved itself into a consideration of the effect
of the act on the public interest. The court was of opinion that the public
was not affected. But if this interest is that the corporation should not exceed
the powers granted it in its charter' then the public apparently is affected. It
would seem that the court had in mind a real interest rather than a nominal one.
It is seldom that an ultra vires act affects the public interest in a real manner,
as is evidenced by the comparatively few occasions in which the attorney general
feels called upon to institute quo warranto proceedings. Except in such cases
the courts are apparently content to permit a corporation to do as it pleases
regardless of its charter powers. This attitude practically results in the renunciation of the doctrine of ultra vires. But such an attitude is not out of har'Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (I9II). See
CONTEMPT (1887)
§21; Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Civil and Criminal
Contempts (1908), 21 HARv. L. REv. 16I. The same act may be both a civil
RAPALJE,

and criminal contempt.

Besette v. Conkey, 194 U. S. 324 (19o3) ; It re Debbs,

158 U. S. 564 (1894).
'National Bankruptcy Act, 44 STAT. 665 (1926), makes the concealment
of assets from the receiver a crime punishable by not more than five years'
imprisonment.
'Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Parlor Car Co., 139 U. S. .524
(i89 i ) ; Brunswick Gas Co. v. U. S. Fuel Co., 85 Me. 532, 27 Atl. 525 (1893);
Buckeye Marble Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115, 20 S. W. 427 (892).
'Pittsburgh C. and L. St. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371 (1889).
'Olson v. Worroad Co., 136 Minn. 3io, 16i N. W. 713 (917).
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mony with the convictions of the New York courts. In 1897 the Appellate
Division declared: "The doctrine of idtra ',ires originated at a time when
nearly all corporations were created for public purposes, and there is no reason
why it should ever have been applied to private corporations any more than
to the powers of individuals in a partnership."' The mortgage is void by the
application of the doctrine. With its renunciation all objections are removed.

CRMIiNAL LAw-LARCENY-CONSENT

OF THE OWNER TO THE TAKING-

A told B, a police officer, that the defendant had several times approached him
.vith the proposal that he should aid the defendant in stealing automobiles. A
and B then arranged a trap, according to which B was to leave his coup6 unlocked, and himself hidden in the back, in a locality from which a number of
other cars had been stolen. That night the defendant and A walked up the
street and the defendant proposed that they should steal the coup6, to which A
agreed. Because the defendant could not drive, A drove under the former's
direction to a nearby village where defendant had a prospective purchaser. While
this purchaser and the defendant were negotiating, B arrested them both. The
Court of Criminal Appeals approved the rule denying a rehearing. Held, that
defendant was guilty of larceny. Jarrottv. State, i S. W. (2d) 61q (Tex. 1928).
In those crimes relating to property, where the non-consent of the owner
to the taking is an essential element, it is well established that if the criminal
intent originated with the accused, the fact that the owner stood passively by
while his property was taken, or even ordered his servant to encourage the
accused in the perpetration of the crime, ill be no defense to a prosecution.'
So long as the owner no more than apparently consents, the courts have held
that there was no consent in fact? But it is also well recognized that the
accused must have performed every element of the crime by himself,' for
"intent alone does not make crime."' In the principal case, the apparent accomplice is the agent of the owner throughout, all his acts are authorized, and
he commits no crime, so the guilt of the accused cannot be predicated on what
is done by the decoy.' It is submitted, therefore, that the court in the principal
case was wrong in holding that "A, in driving the car, was in such capacity
acting as defendant's agent, and the two actually had physical possession and
'Chas. F. Holm v. The Clair Lipsius Brewing Co., 21 App. Div. 204 (N. Y.
1897).
'State v. Abley, io9 Iowa 6I, 8o N. W. 225 (1899); Com. v. Nott, 135
Mass. 269 (1883) ; Com. v. Hollister, i57 Pa. 13, 27 At. 386 (1893).
'People v. Hanselman, 76 Cal. 46o, i8 Pac. 425 (1888) ; People v. Smith,
P5i Ill. I85, 95 N. E. io4i (1911); Sanders v. State, 2 Shannon, Cas. 6o6
(Tenn. 1877).
'People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185 (1878); Williams v. State, 55 Ga. 391
(1875) ; State v. Currie, 13 N. D. 655, 1o2 N. W. 875 (905).
'State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. 498, 505 (1879).
'Reg. v. Johnson, i Car. & M. 218 (Eng. 184); Allen v. State, 4o Ala.
334 (1867) ; State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, r6 S. W. 514 (i89i) ; Speiden v. State,
3 Tex. App. I56 (1877).
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control of it." If A had not driven the car, the defendant would have been
unable to make off with it,' and the owner, actually, though secretly, present,
must be held to have consented to all that was done by A as his agent.

CRIMINAL LAw-TRIAL--NoNDRECTION THAT JuRy HAS THE RIGHT TO
Fix PENALTY IN MuRuER TRiAL-A statute gives the jury the right to fix the
penalty at life imprisonment or death in case of a conviction of murder in the
first degree. In a murder trial no request for instruction as to this ight was
made, and the judge inadvertently failed to inform the jury. A verdict of
guilty "and the penalty death" was returned. Held, that the failure to charge
is reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Madaffer, 291 Pa. 270 (1928).

As a general rule mere nondirection is not reversible error.' Counsel
should, by asking for proper instructions, protect the rights of his client.!
However in criminal trials, and particularly in trials for murder, it is a duty
of the judge, even in the absence of a request, to instruct the jury as to the
law on all the material issues involved.' In Pennsylvania counsel cannot waive
this right.4 By the statute in question' the jury is given the right to fix the
penalty. This would seem to be a material issue0 The court, following decisions under the degree act," and influenced by the fact.that this was a recent
'Cf. State v. Jansen, supra note 4, where the owner of a saloon was told
by the detectives setting the trap to leave the rear door unfastened because the
parties expected would not break a lock.
'See 2 THOMPSON, TRIALS (2d ed. 1912) § 2339 et seq.; Note (1924) 23
MicH. L. Rxv. 276; Commonwealth v. Caraffa, 222 Pa. 297, 71 At. 17 (908);
Commonwealth v. Payne, 242 Pa. 394, 89 Atl. 559 (1913).
'THOMPSON op. cit. supra note I. But see RALSTON, Charging the Fury
in a Trial for Murder (1912) 46 Am. L. REv. 397, 415, 434, to the effect that a
long list of instructions tend to confuse both court and jury. At common law,
since in criminal cases there was no appeal, no provisions existed for requiring
the court to charge on particular points. III Wharton (ioth ed. 1918) § 1644.
'Commonwealth v. Smith, 221 Pa. 553, 70 Atl. 85o (19o8); Meyers v.
Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 131 (1876) ; State v. Clary, 84 Vt. 110, 78 Atl. 717

(igio) ; Sanders v. State, 41 Tex. 3o6 (1874) ; People v. Murray, 72 Mich. Io,
4o N. W. 29 (i888). Contra: Keech v. State, I5 Fla. 59i (1874); Jones v.
State, 20 Ohio 34 (1851) ; State v. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718, 22 S. E. 3io (1895) ;

and see Honeycutt v. State, 8 (Baxt.) Tenn. 371 (875).
In Mississippi it is
error to charge unless requested. Pringle v. State, io8 Miss. 8o, 813, 67 So.
455 (914).

"Meyers v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 131 (1876).
'Act of May 14, 1925 P. L. 759: "Every person convicted of the crime of
murder of the first degree shall be sentenced to suffer death, in the manner
provided by law, or to undergo imprisonment for life, at the discretion of the
jury trying the case, which shall fix the penalty by its verdict. . . ." Amending § 75 Act of March 13, i86o P. L. 382, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 7975.
'2 THOMPSON op. cit. supra note I § 2188 says that here most jurisdictions

would hold failure to charge reversible error. See cases contra, supra note 3.
'Act of March 31, i86o P. L. 402, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 7974; Commonwealth v. Ferko, 269 Pa. 39, 43, 112 Atl. 38 (1920).
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and radical change in the law, reasoned that the jury could not be presumed to
know of it, and that failure to charge that the jury could fix the penalty was
reversible error.' It has been said that the purpose of this act is to secure more
convictions in proper cases, by allowing the jury to fix the lesser penalty in
cases where they might otherwise acquit the defendant rather than bring in a
verdict the necessary consequence of which would be the death penalty.' Under
this view the failure to charge would be prejudicial to the state and not to the
defendant. It would therefore not be reversible, since ordinarily the state cannot appeal.!' The defendant instead of being prejudiced is in effect given two
chances; by failing to request the charge he can take the chance of being
acquitted by a conscientious jury, and if convicted can appeal the case and
receive a new trial. This result, added to the fact that in Pennsylvania the
state rarely makes requests for instructions, t would in effect tend to defeat
the purposes of the statute. To overcome this result the proper solution would
seem to be as the court found, in making it a duty of the judge to inform the
jury as to their privilege. Therefore, although in the principal case a new trial
results from the nondirection, the ruling will tend to reduce the number of new
trials in the future, and also obtain convictions more readily in cases which
warrant them.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO PLACE ON PROBATION-The defendant was convicted of a violation of the National Prohibition
Act and sentenced to a term of three months. Sentence was commenced the
same day. The following day, and during the same term of court, the court
ordered the defendant released and placed on probation for two years. The
United States appealed from this order to the Circuit Court of Appeals which
certified the question of the legality of the action to the Supreme Court. The
Federal Probdtion Act of x925' reads: "The courts . . . shall have
to
power, after conviction or after plea of guilty or nolo contendre . .
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant
upon probation." Held, that the District Court had no power to place the
defendant on probation, as execution of the sentence had commenced. United
States v. Glen Murray, 48 Sup. Ct. 146 (1928).
Formerly there was a conflict among the federal courts, as well as in the
state courts, concerning the power of a court to indefinitely suspend imposition

'Marshall v. State, 33 Tex. 664 (870) (a similar case).. See cases supra
note 3.
'PA. B. A. REP. 48 (1925) ; see SHIPLEY, Does Capital Punishment Prevent
Convictions (1909) 43 Am. L. REv. 321, 322, 334; Note (i9o9) 43 Am. L. REv.
684; Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. 396 (1864) (suggesting the same reason
for passing the degree act).
" Commonwealth v. Goble, 9 Pa. Sup. 215 (1899); see SADLER CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1903) § 584 for exceptions.
' See SADLER, op. cit. supra § 496. "It is unusual for points to be submitted
by the Commonwealth, and the practice has been condemned." Murray v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 311 (1875).
143 STAT. 1259 (1925), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XVIII, § 724.
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or execution of a criminal sentence.' The Supreme Court settled the controversy in the federal courts in Ex parte United States, holding no such power
existed.' The Federal Probation Act came as a culmination of eight years'
effort in Congress to ameliorate the effect of this decision. Unfortunately, the
ProbationAct is not clear as to the time when the power to place on probation
can be exercised, the result being a difference in interpretation among the
In the district court case of United States v. ChafinaP
lower federal courts
the court decided that probation could be granted at any time, on the ground
that the statute was remedial, to be broadly construed, and since it fixed no
time limit, the court should not read one into it. The Supreme Court, in deciding that the power could not be exercised after execution of sentence had commenced, laid great emphasis upon the history of the Act. Stress was also laid
upon the report of the Committee on Judiciary of the House," as indicative of
the intention of Congress. It pointed out that relief of persons who had
already begun sentence was provided by the clemency powers of the President
and the Board of Parole; also by the Act of z9o2' which provides for commutation for good behavior. What was lacking, felt the Court, was relief
before sentence had begun, to avoid the criminal stigma. The fear of further
burdening the dockets of the federal judges with innumerable applications for
reprieve, was another reason for limiting the scope of the Act. The court also
pointed to the well-recognized common law rule that after sentence had begun,
a court had no power to change or set aside the sentence imposed, even in
It was felt that the ProbationAct should be construed
the same term of court
in harmony with this fundamental proposition. The conclusion reached is
apparently in accord with the intention of Congress, and wisely leaves the
powers of clemency, after sentence has begun, to the executive branch of the
government."
' The following cases held there was no power in the court to suspend sentence indefinitely: United States v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748 (i8gi); People v.
Barrett, 202 Ill. 287, 67 N. E. 23 (903) ; State v. Smith, 173 Ind. 388, 9o N. E.
6o7 (19io). Contra: Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133
(1874) ; People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, i4i N. Y. 288, 36 N. E.
386 (1894); Commonwealth v. Dunleavy, i6 Pa. Super. 380 (1901). Federal
judges in Massachusetts and Ohio particularly, exercised the power, but the
validity of such action was not determined in the Supreme Court until igi6.
3242 U. S.-27 (igi6).
The court recognized the power to suspend sentence temporarily for good
cause.
In accord with the conclusion in the principal case are: Nix v. James,
District Judge, 7 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. gth, 1925); Davis v. United States,
Contra: United States v. Chafina, i4 F.
i5 F. (2d) 697 (W. D. Ark. 1926).
(2d) 622 (D. Ariz. 1926) ; and see United States v. Nix, 8 F. (2d) 759 (S. D.
Cal. 1925).

'United States v. Chafina, supra note 5.
Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, second session.
832 STAT. 397 (19o02), U. S. C. (925) TIT. XVIII, § 710.
'Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U. S. 1873); State v. Addy, 43 N. J. L.
113 (1881) ; People v. Sullivan, 54 Misc. 489, io6 N. Y. Supp. 143 (907).
"0A fortiori the Probation Act does not permit suspension of sentence after
sentence has begun and in a subsequent term of court. Frederick A. Cook v.
United States, decided with the principal case.
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EXECUTORS AND ADmINISTRATORS-PARTITION--INDEBTEDNESS OF INSOLVENT DEVISEE TO ESTATE AS LIEN ON His SHARE OF THE REALTY-In an equi-

table action for partition of lands devised to the children of testator, one of
the devisees was insolvent and indebted both to the estate and to a bank. Before
he was adjudged a bankrupt, the bank reduced its claim to judgment. The
estate still being open, and the testator having left no personalty to be distributed, the executor claimed a lien upon the debtor's share of the realty which was

allowed by the court, and the bank appealed. Held, that the executor has a lien
superior to the bank's judgment lien. Schultz v. Locke, 216 N. W. 617 (Iowa
1927).

A majority of states hold that the indebtedness of the devisee to the testator
cannot be charged on the realty devised
But a growing number of jurisdictions have considered it more equitable to allow the personal representative to
collect such debts out of the realty where the debtor's share of the personalty
is insufficient A reason given for the former view is that, inasmuch as the
executor has nothing to do with realty specifically devised, unless it be needed
for the payment of the testator's debts, he has no opportunity to exercise a lien.
Furthermore, if the testator desire that the estate devised should be charged
or incumbered with the payment of debts due from the devisee, he should so
provide in his will. The modem tendency to allow retainer by the personal
representative is based either upon statutest treating realty and personalty alike,
or upon the theory that the distributee has already received a part of his share.'
The Iowa courts, while recognizing the general rule, have shown a disposition
to make exceptions where the devisee is insolvent and in debt to the estate.
In the absence of legislation varying the common law, it is difficult to see how
the mere insolvency of an indebted devisee can give the executor a control over
the realty which he can normally exercise only to pay the debts of the testator.
Where the right of retainer is allowed, however, there is authority for the
holding that the judgment lien of another creditor will not defeat this right.7
'Jones v. Treadwell, i69 Mass. 430, 48 N. E. 339 (1897) ; Broas v. Broas,
153 Mich. 310, ii6 N. W. io77 (19o8); La Foy v. La Foy, 43 N. J. Eq. 2o6,
io AUt. 266 (1887).

See Notes, I A. L. R. io27 (I919); 30 A. L. R. 775

(0924).

' New v. New, 127 Ind. 576, 27 N. E. 154 (189i) ; Boyer v. Robinson, 26
Wash. 117, 66 Pac. ii9 (1901) ; 3 WOERxNER, AmERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) I926, and cases cited.
'Dearborn v. Preston, 7 Allen 192, 195 (Mass. 1863); Marvin v. Bowlby,
142 Mich. 245, 255, 105 N. W. 751, 755 (1905).
'Streety v. McCurdy, 1o4 Ala. 493, i6 So. 686 (1894); Stenson v. Halvorson Co., 28 N. D. 151, 147 N. W. 8oo (1914); Keever v. Hunter, 62 Ohio
St. 616, 57 N. E. 454 (900).

New v. New, Boyer v. Robinson, both supra note 2. In Pennsylvania, the
rule is observed that where funds, whether proceeds from the sale of real or
personal property, are in the hands of the court for distribution, "the court will
ascertain and enforce such equities as are necessary to equalize, as far as it
can, the shares of the respective heirs in the estate of the decedent." Dickinson's Estate, 148 Pa. x42, 145, 23 AUt. 1053 (1892).

"Woods v. Knotts, i96 Iowa 544, 194 N. W. 953 (i923); Senneff v.
Brackey, i65 Iowa 525, 146 N. W. 24 (1914).
'Streety v. McCurdy, Stenson v. Halvorson Co., both supra note 4.
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QUASI CONTRACTs-RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER TERms OF EXECUTED ILLEGAL CONTRACT-In consideration for his appointment as county treasurer, the plaintiff contracted with the county board to pay certain premiums on
his official bond, although a statute' required that these be paid by the county.
After the contract had been fully performed on both sides, the plaintiff brought
this action for money paid for the use of the defendant county. Held (two
justices dissenting), that the plaintiff recover. Bosshard v. Steele County, 217
N. W. 354 (Minn. 1927).

Even in the absence of a statute, a contract seeking to influence an appointment to public office, or to vary the compensation provided by law for that
office, is illegal and void? In general, one in pari delicto may not enforce, in
quasi contract or otherwise,' any rights arising from an illegal transaction."
Where, however, the contract is executory, a party may be permitted to recover

in quasi contract for benefits conferred on the other party, on the theory of
locus pcnitentia,.
If the contract be executed, no such recovery for benefits
may be had because the illegal purpose has been fully consummated.' But even
in the case of an executed illegal contract, where a strong public policy exists
in favor of protecting one class of persons against another, a party in the
former class, although in pari delicto, is permitted to recover in quasi contract
for benefits conferred upon a member of the latter class under an executed
ill~gal contract The existence of a statute imposing a duty upon members
of the latter class is considered to be a sufficient expression of public policy to
1
MINN. GEN. STAT. (1923) § 84o.
"3 WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS

(1920)

§ 173o;

DONNELLY,

LIC CONTRACTS (1922)
§101; GREENHOOD, PUBLIC
CONTRACTS (1886)
338; Note (1921) 92 CENT. L.

J.

THE LAW OF PUB-

POuCY IN THE LAW OF
192.
Contra: White v.

White, 159 La. io65, io6 So. 567 (1925).

'Bothwell v. Buckbee-Meers Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Dec. 5, 1927;
Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197 U. S. 224 (19o5); Norbeck and
Nicholson Co. v. State, 32 S. D. 189, I42 N. W. 847 (1913); WOODWARD, THE
(1913) § 135; 2 PAGE, CONTRACTS (1920) § io6i.
Contra: Hill County v. Shaw Co., 225 Fed. 475 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) (inalum
prohibitin).
' As relief is refused to protect the public and punish the plaintiff, rather
than to protect the defendant, he should not be estopped or precluded from
LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS

pleading his own illegal act. Goodrich v. Northwestern Telephone Co., 161
Minn. xo6, 2o1 N. W. 290 (1924); Lanhan v. Meadows, 72 W. Va. 61o, 78
S. E. 750 (1913). For a discussion of the rule, applied to examples, see
Contra: Hoefeld v. Oxello,
SALMOND AND WINFIELD, CONTRACTS (1927) § 53.
213 Ill. App. 152 (1919) ; Paul v. Paul, 266 Pa. 241, 1o9 Atl. 674 (192o). •
'Town of Meredith v. Fullerton, 139 AtI. 359 (N. H. 1927); Boyd v.
Boyd, i12 Or. 658, 230 Pac. 541 (1924) ; Trammell v. San Antonio Life Ins.
Co., 209 S. W. 786 (Tex. Civ. App. igig).
'See Notes (1926) 45 A. L. R. 14o6; (1923) 23 CoL L. REv. 665; (189o)
89 L. T. 269; KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS (1893) 262, 263; WILLISTON, Op. cit.

supra note 2, § 1787.
Rideout v. Mars, 99 Miss. 199, 54 So. 8oi (1911)
Darnell-Love Lumber Co. v. Wiggs, 144 Tenn. 113,

(insurance premium);
S. W. 391 (1921)

230

(corporation buying its own stock, stockholder suing); Duddy-Robinson Co.

v. Taylor, 137 Wash. 304, 242 Pac. 21 (1926) (same, corporation suing); 2
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 941. Some writers consider
that the parties are not in pari delicto in such a case. WOODWARD, op. cit. supra
note 3, §§ 139, 140.
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permit recovery, whether or not the primary purpose in passing the statute was
to protect the first class of persons.8 This principle has been crystallized into
a test: that the plaintiff can recover if he can make out his case without reference to the illegal contract
In all cases where a public officer has entered
into an illegal contract to take less than the statutory compensation, he can
recover the amount to which he is by law entitled by suing in quasi contract,
alleging the statutory duty of the defendant to pay.Y It would seem that, on
account of the public policy in favor of protecting public officers, the same rule
is applicable in the situation of the principal case, where the officer pays part
of the statutory obligations of the county. While it may appear unjust to
allow recovery, it must be remembered that the plaintiff may be punishable
criminally, and that, although the parties are in pari delicto, the public policy
favors the plaintiff.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE PROVIDING
defendant was
convicted of a violation of the prohibition law. At the trial in a county circuit
court, there was introduced in evidence against him certain liquors seized under
and by virtue of a search warrant which had been issued by the clerk of a
municipal court, pursuant to the authority conferred by a special act of the
legislature
The defendant contended on appeal that the issuance of the search
warrant constituted a judicial act, the power to perform which could not be con2
ferred upon a clerk of court under the state constitution. Held (two judges dis3
senting), that the statute was constitutional.
State v. Van Brocklin, 217 N. W.
277 (Wis. 1927).
FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS BY CLERKS OF COURT-The

8

Town of Nortonville v. Woodward, 191 Ky. 730, 231 S. W. 224
cases cited infra note IO; BENJAMIN, CONTRACTS (1907) 288; (1926)
39 HARv. L. REv. 509.
'Scott v. Wiswall, 86 Fed. 671 (C. C. A. 2d, x898). The test has been
severely criticised. KEENER, op. cit. supra note 6, 274, 275; WOODWARD, op. cit.
supra note 3, § 143; WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1753; 2 ELLIOTT, CON§§ 1071-1073. See Note (I92O) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 273.
TRACTS (913)
" Pitsch v. Continental Nat. Bank, 305 Ill. 265, 137 N. E. 198 (1922);
Bodenhofer v. Hogan, 142 Iowa 321, 12o N. W. 659 (19o9) ; Pitt v. Board of
Education, 216 N. Y. 304, n1o N. E. 612 (1915) ; Note (0923) 25 A. L. R. 170.
Contra: McNulty v. Kansas City, 201 Mo. App. 562, 198 S. W. 185 (1917),
aff'd 278 Mo. 42, 210 S. W. 881 (I919).
(1921) ;

'Wis. Laws, 1895 c. 24. A local law creating the municipal court of the
city of Oshkosh, in the county of Winnebago, conferring upon the clerk of that
court the following powers: "He may examine on oath all persons applying for
warrants, may reduce their examination to writing and file the same, and issue
all warrants and other processes from said court."
' Constitution of Wisconsin, art. 7, sect. 2: "The judicial power of this
state, both as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in" various courts
named.
'Constitution of Wisconsin, art. 7, sect. 23: "The Legislature may provide
for the appointment of one or more persons in each organized county, and may
vest in such persons such judicial powers as shall be prescribed by law . .
provided that said power shall not exceed that of a judge of a circuit court at
chambers."
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Where there is a constitutional provision, as in Wisconsin,4 which provides that "the judicial power of this state, both as to matters of law and
equity, shall be vested in" various courts named, judicial power may be conferred by the legislature only upon those particular courts. The office of clerk
of court is ministerial, and includes no judicial authority other than that granted
by constitutional and legislative provisions.' It has been held under a constitutional provision, similar to that mentioned, that issuing a warrant for arrest
requires the determination of probable cause, and is therefore a judicial function
that cannot be conferred on a clerk of court. 6 Some 'courts have, however,
sustained the validity of statutes authorizing a clerk of court to issue warrants
for arrest. One line of reasoning supports this conclusion on the ground that,
although a warrant for arrest issues only after a finding of probable cause,
supported by oath and affirmation, yet as a matter of law this is in itself probable cause, therefore the clerk is not called upon to act in a judicial capacity
Other courts do so by distinguishing between the judicial power conferred upon
the courts, and power of a judicial nature, or what is called a quasi judicial
power, which attaches to certain ministerial duties from the very nature of the
office.8 Wisconsin has held that since the clerk is under the supervision of the
judge and subject to his control the act is that of the court, even though the
judge knew nothing of the particular warrant.' The court in the principal case
recognized the fiction underlying this decision, but approved the result and
endorsed the distinction between judicial power conferred on courts and the
quasi judicial power to be exercised by the clerk of court under his statutory
authority. The determination of probable cause in the case of search warrants
is not such a judicial function as can be conferred on a clerk of court without
express legislative and constitutional authority'
Search and seizure is the first
step in a judicial proceeding for forfeiture of the thing seized,' which will be
used as evidence not otherwise obtainable in a criminal prosecution. Considering the constitutional safeguards applicable to this sort of evidence,' and the
judicial power to be exercised in issuing the search warrant, it does not seem
that there is exercised only a quasi judicial power. Therefore an express grant
of judicial power should come from a legislature authorized to dispense it.
'Supra note 2.
Hughes v. Streeter, 24 Ill. 647 (186o) ; Gardner v. Bunn, 132 Ill. 403, 23
N. E. io72 (189o) ; In re Terrill, 52 Kan. 29, 34 Pac. 457 (893).
'People v. Colleton, 59 Mich. 573, 26 N. W. 771 (1886). Cf. Toms v.
Judge, 237 Mich. 413, 2r2 N. W. 69 (1927).
"In re Siebert, 61 Kan. 1H2, 58 Pac. 971 (1899).
'Kreulhans v. Birmingham, 164 Ala. 623, 51 So. 297 (1go9) ; in re Durant,

6o Vt. 176, 12 Atl: 65o (1887). See also State v. Krohne, 4 Wyo. 347, 34 Pac.
3 (893) on power of clerk to fix and let to bail.
'Ryan v. State, 83 Wis. 486, 53 N. W. 836 (1892).
" State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, ig N. W. 282 (1924) ; State v. Lock, 30
Mo. 400, 259 S. W. 116 (923) ; People v. Fons, 223 Mich. 603, 194 N. W.
543 (923).
"Keefe v. Clark, 287 Fed. 372 (D. C. D. Mass. 1923).
'Wisconsin Constitution, art. x, sect. 8: "No person shall be . . . com-

pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." That search and
seizure must not be unreasonable, see Note (1923) 27 A. L. R. 709.
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Although the constitutional provision' invoked by the court to sustain, the
validity of the special statute 4 appears on its face to give the legislature the
necessary authority, yet the court seems to have carried this provision into a
field where it has never before been applied."
' 2Supra note 3.
SSulpra note i.
"From dissenting opinion in principal case: "no illustration is afforded of
any single prior instance in the state's history where it has been asserted or
claimed that Art. 7, Sect. 23, has been considered as a legislative source of power
for any other office or officer than court commissioner."

